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Abstract 
In the present study, we ask: Does empathy also support cooperative behaviors when the 
status (high, low) of an individual differs relative to other group members and is determined 
by either chance or effort? In response to this unexplored question, the present study involved 
a series of four experiments using a linear public goods game (Experiment 1-3, 4-player, 
Experiment 4, 2-player). Regardless of the way in which status was achieved (chance, effort) 
those with low status cooperated more compared with their high status counterparts. Empathy 
in and of itself revealed very small overall increases in cooperative behavior. Overall, status 
and monetary incentives appear to be more salient than empathy in guiding behaviors in a 
social dilemma task. 
 
Keywords: status, cooperation, chance vs. effort, empathy, incentives, public goods 
game (PGG),  
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Introduction 
How we come to gain our resources has been a matter of interest for many 
psychologists and economists, because the general speculation is that we are uniquely tuned 
to whether they are gained fairly or unfairly. For instance, equality of opportunity (Loury, 
1981) refers to situations in which, ceteris paribus (all else being equal), the opportunity for 
gaining resources is either determined through chance factors, which all members of a group 
are subject to, or through effort alone. This means that the perception of fairness in the 
opportunities to gain resources will vary with respect to how they are gained, and there is 
speculation that this also influences the type of interactions between individuals of differing 
levels of resources. For instance, the psychological state of fairness is “the concern to be 
treated equally, includes the concern for how much money or resource are distributed 
amongst individuals (distributive fairness) and the belief that one should receive what one is 
due based on one’s actions (reciprocal fairness)” (Kamas & Preston, 2012, p. 538). Moreover, 
Yamamoto and Takimoto (2012) claim that prosocial behaviors, motivated by empathic 
concerns, can only exist in connection to a sense of fairness, which is determined by the way 
in which resources are gained and how they are distributed. The implications here being that, 
empathic concern may support pro-social behaviors within a social context, but these may be 
potentially attenuated depending on how unfairly resources are perceived to be, or actually, 
gained.  
On this basis, the present study aims to address the following two questions:  1) To 
what extent are pro-social behaviors impacted in situations in which the resources gained 
(either through chance or effort) by one individual in the group differ? 2) To what extent does 
empathy promote pro-social behaviors given the way in which one individual in a group 
achieves their status (i.e. through chance or effort)? Thus far, prior work has examined these 
questions separately, and so the aim of the present study is to address both within the same 
experimental set up. To investigate the first question, in a pro-social decision-making task, 
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the impact on pro-social behaviors was examined when the status achieved by one individual 
within the group, was determined experimentally by the amount of initial endowment (High 
vs. Low), achieved either through effort or chance. To investigate the second question, given 
the manipulation of status, empathy was experimentally induced towards other individuals in 
a group decision-making task in order to investigate the impact on pro-social behaviors. In 
what follows, we first provide details regarding the operationalization of the key concepts (i.e. 
cooperation, status, empathy) that inform the manipulations we introduce in our experiments, 
we then discuss previous work examining the relationship between status and cooperation, 
and empathy and cooperation, and thereafter provide the theoretical foundations for the 
specific predictions we test in our four experiments.  
Operationalization of Cooperation, Status, and Empathy 
Cooperation: Pro-social behaviors are often taken to include a broad category of acts 
that are agreed by some significant proportion of society, or one’s social group, as behaviors 
that are generally beneficial to others (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). In the 
present study, consistent with others (Marcus, 1991), we treat cooperation as an example of a 
pro-social behavior. In definitions of cooperation, an essential property is the relationships 
between the individual’s roles within a group. If cooperation is considered from the 
perspective of an individual within a group, the definition of cooperation is behavior that 
benefits the group or collective, often at the cost of individual benefits (Irwin, McGrimmon, 
& Simpson, 2008). If cooperation is considered from the view of individuals performing joint 
behaviors, then cooperation is behaviors directed toward a goal in which the participants 
gain equal rewards (Marwell & Schmitt, 1975), and, to further qualify the mutual aspect, 
they should also have shared intentions (Derlega & Grzelak, 1982; Liebal, Colombi, Rogers, 
Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008; Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). However, as many have 
discussed, outcomes of cooperative behaviors need not be based on altruistic motivations, 
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and so in the same vein, joint action need not be based on mutual motivations. Crucially the 
shared goal of the cooperative endeavor is key. Thus, consolidating the different approaches 
to conceptualizing cooperation, we propose that what is critical to cooperation is behaviors 
directed toward a shared goal in which a participant performs an action that another(s) gain 
rewards from. 
Status: When it comes to status, in the present study we treat status as a term that 
includes, but is not limited to, constructs such as socioeconomic status (SES), social 
influence resource-holding potential, and social class (Kafashan, Sparks, Griskevicius, & 
Barclay, 2014), the latter of which has been found to affect behaviors associated with social 
engagement (Cote, 2011; Kraus & Stephens, 2012). Status here tends to reflect subjective 
judgments about one’s standing within a group (relative to others in that group), and is often 
based on one’s views about one’s prestige, for which “respect” gained by others is the basis 
of judged prestige as proposed by the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2003). 
Alternatively, and a concept adopted in the present study, is that status is determined more 
explicitly by the assets that each member of the group have gained (i.e. financial wealth 
relative to each group) (Bothner, Kim & Smith, 2012).  
Empathy: Empathy has been defined as “the ability to recognize and understand the 
thought process of another ” (Underwood & Moore, 1982, p. 144) and “the ability to identify 
and understand the feelings of another” (Krebs, 1975, p. 1135). Here empathy consists of two 
components, cognitive empathy and affective empathy. Cognitive empathy is also called 
“cold” empathy or “perspective taking” or “theory of mind”, whereas affective empathy is 
referred to as “hot” empathy (Loewenstein, 2000; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). Empathy, in 
general, makes it possible to understand the behaviors of family, friends or even strangers, 
from the point of view of the emotional reasons behind their actions. Some have gone as far 
to suggest that without empathy, it is impossible for us to interact with others appropriately 
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(Baron-Cohen, 2011). Given the multifaceted nature of empathy, some researchers have 
attempted to consolidate the various aspect of empathy by considering eight uses of the term 
of empathy (Batson, 2011, pp. 12-19). Looking across the various definitions of empathy, 
and consolidating much of the social psychological literature on empathy, we propose that 
typically empathy is an other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived 
welfare of someone in need. The emotional states that are elicited can include sympathy, 
compassion, softheartedness, tenderness, sorrow, sadness, upset, distress, concern, and grief; 
and it involves feelings for the other rather than the self. Put more succinctly, our definition 
treats empathy as an emotional state in which people display “empathic concern”, though this 
could also be dispositional, in that people vary in the degree to which they display the state of 
empathic concern.  
Previous work examining associations between achieved status and cooperation 
Previous work has explored the basis on which status is achieved and the impact that 
it has on pro-social behaviors. Several studies have manipulated the basis on which assets are 
gained (i.e. tokens that were then used in a cooperative game) either through chance, or 
through effort. For instance, in some cases participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions in which effort (high vs. low) determined the basis on which assets (50 tokens) 
were gained (Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2009). Alternatively, tokens could be randomly 
assigned to participants by the experimenter in advance to mimic acquisition of assets via 
inheritance (Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992) or via lotteries. Equal opportunity via effort 
was examined by assigning tokens based on performance on a specific task prior to playing a 
cooperative game, which was designed to mimic situations in which access to greater wealth 
is achieved by meeting performance criteria in job settings (Kroll, Cherry, & Shogren, 2007). 
Taken together, the general pattern of findings suggests that cooperative behaviors are 
reduced for those that achieve their status through effort (Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2009; 
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Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). However, thus far, there is no direct comparison of the 
impact on cooperation, within the same task paradigm, when assets are achieved either 
through chance or effort. Moreover, there are no direct comparisons of achieved status (i.e. 
through chance or effort) on cooperative behaviors within a group, when status manipulations 
impact only one of the members of the group. Thus, prior work provides vital clues regarding 
a link between status and cooperative behaviors, but does no enable a clear understanding of 
the degree to which status gained by either chance or effort has differential effects on levels 
of cooperation within a group, which provides further motivation for our study.  
Previous work examining associations between empathy and cooperation 
One of the most common ways to promote cooperation is through the inducement of 
empathy. Typically, empathy inducement methods (e.g., the presentation of stories of 
suffering, or being instructed to perspective take) is introduced as an independent variable in 
experimental studies in order to examine the effects of empathy on cooperation in laboratory 
settings using variants of economic games (e.g. Public Goods Game (PGG), Prisoners 
Dilemma). Many studies have reported that empathy induction promotes or at least maintains 
cooperative behaviors (Allsop, Fifield, & Seiter, 2002; Batson & Moran, 1999; Cialdini et al., 
1987; Eimontaite, Nicolle, Schindler, & Goel, 2013; Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & 
Varney, 1986; Oswald, 1996, 2002; Pavey, Greitemeyer, & Sparks, 2012; Rumble, Van 
Lange, & Parks, 2010; Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006; Xu, Kou,Zhong, 2012). 
However, investigations that have since tried to replicate these studies have reported a null 
effect of empathy induction on cooperation (LV, Proulx, Osman, 2015; Oswald, 1996; 
Warren & Walker, 1991; Xu et al., 2012, Study 2). Other than typical cooperative laboratory 
based tasks, alternatives such as resource allocation games that involve negotiation between 
groups of participants, have tried to induce perspective taking (i.e. cold empathy) (Epley, 
Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Gilin, Maddux, Carpenter & Galinsky, 2012) as well as empathy 
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(i.e. hot empathy) (Cohen, 2010; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Gilin, et al, 2012) 
as a means of promoting pro-social behaviors. As with studies using economic type games, 
the findings here are also mixed. Taken together, the pattern of findings regarding the 
positive impact of empathy, both hot and cold versions, on pro-social behaviors is not 
reliable, particularly perspective taking manipulations. For this reason, we aim to further 
investigate whether it might be the case that the empathy-cooperation link is more likely to be 
strengthened in situations where resources are gained fairly (equal-resource distribution) as 
compared to less fairly (unequal-resource distribution) (Yamamoto & Takimoto, 2012).  
Theoretical underpinnings 
As outlined earlier, one motivation of the present study is to examine the link between 
the basis on which status is gained, and levels of cooperative behavior. Kafashan et al. (2014) 
has proposed that the association between the two arises as a result of two different functions, 
based on their bi-directional causation account for which there is considerable evidence. 
Either pro-social behavior can be used to help achieve status (Willer, 2009a), or possessing 
status can change the perceived costs and benefits of engaging in pro-social behavior; this 
second functional role is the focus of the present study. The former suggests that collective 
behaviors can be used to profit an individual’s status, thus prosocial behavior functions to 
achieve or maintain status, which can either be material or social rewards. For instance, in a 
management context, group performance can contribute to the status of an individual that is 
taking responsibility for the group (i.e. the formation of leaders) (Henrich, Chudek, & Boyd, 
2015), the impact of which can be material as well as reputational.  
With regards to the second functional association, the status of an individual can 
impact the dependency of others within a group, and they behave pro-socially to maintain or 
lessen the status of the individual within the group. For instance, there is considerable work 
showing that when it comes to charitable donations low-status individuals are more likely to 
Mediators of Cooperation   8 
show pro-social behavior than high status individuals (Bennett, 2012; Guinote, Cotzia, 
Sandhu, & Siwa, 2015; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). One reason for this is 
that inflated personal views of one’s personal status can be used to justify the reduced levels 
of generosity towards other group members (Hays & Blader, 2016); the costs are perceived as 
high and the benefits are perceived as low with respect to inequality of resource allocation. 
Resource-based exchange theories claim that the exchange of material resources is the 
fundamental reason that people act cooperatively, including interdependence theory 
(Joireman, Kuhlman, Van Lange, Doi, & Shelley, 2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Van Lange 
& Gallucci, 2003). Alternatively, identity-based theories such as group engagement model 
(Tyler & Blader, 2003) and appropriateness framework (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004) 
claim that behaving cooperatively helps to obtain identity through group membership. 
According to resource-based exchange theories, differences in social status affects one’s 
costs and benefits analysis with resultant changes in behavior towards others. Therefore, if 
changes occur to a person’s relative status within a group, the proclivity for cooperative 
behavior will change due to either the change in obtained material resources, or the relative 
identity they could potentially obtain.  
Some work has looked at the extent to which these theoretical accounts are supported 
empirically through laboratory tasks such as linear public goods game (PGG) which consists 
of only one Nash equilibrium that everyone contribute nothing, and one Pareto efficient 
solution that everyone contribute everything (Abele, Stasser, & Chartier, 2010). Here each of 
four players can choose to contribute a certain amount of their endowment to a common pot 
(i.e. an index of cooperation), which is distributed equally amongst all four players. In typical 
versions of linear PGG each player is endowed with the same amount of tokens (homogenous 
set up), but introducing heterogeneity via an unequal amount of tokens can serve as a proxy 
for different levels of status (Cherry, Kroll, & Shogren, 2005). Consistent with work on status 
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and charitable donations, there is some evidence to suggest that low-status individuals (i.e. 
those endowed with less tokens than the rest of the group) contributed more than high status 
individuals (Bennett, 2012). Given that experimental manipulations of endowment 
heterogeneity in PGG creates a lab-analogue of low-status and high-status, we use a similar 
paradigm in the present study. Based on previous work assuming a functional relationship 
such that status affects the costs and benefits of pro-social behavior, high status individual 
will view the costs of pro-sociality as higher than low status individuals, because of their 
perceived entitlement of their status. Thus we test the following predictions: 
Prediction 1: Overall low-status individuals will show greater cooperation, as 
evidenced through contributions to a public good, compared to high-status individuals.  
Prediction 2: If perceived entitlement plays a role, then high status individuals will 
feel more entitled when they achieve their status through effort than when achieved through 
chance, and so will display lower levels of cooperation through contributions to a public good 
compared to high-status individuals achieving their status through chance. 
To the extent that individuals show any cooperative behaviors in the empirical work 
discussed, we need to consider what the possible underlying mechanism is that promotes this 
type of behavior. Moreover, if high status individuals typically show less cooperative 
behaviors than low status individuals, we consider it of importance to empirically investigate 
ways in which we can artificially promote cooperative behaviors through empathy. The 
grounds on which we consider the potential positive impact of empathy on promoting 
cooperation in general, as well as on those that achieve high status, comes from social 
psychological research. Social psychological theories claim that humans display cooperative 
behaviors through a mechanism that suggests a central role for empathy.  
Existing resource-based exchange theories emphasize self-interested motives or 
economic motivations as the basis on which cooperative behaviors are observed. Nonetheless, 
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economic motivations (i.e. maximizing personal wealth) do not fully explain the range of 
possible reasons for acting cooperatively in mixed-motives dilemma games (e.g., PGG). For 
these reasons alternative accounts have been proposed that suggest empathic concern for 
others can motivate cooperative behaviors at a personal cost to each individual.  
One reason for this is that it is claimed that a feature of humans that apparently sets us 
apart from other species is our focus on others’ well-being (broadly referred to as altruism) 
(Batson, 2011). Also, we will, sometimes, at great personal cost, protest outcomes that we 
consider unfair, whether they personally affect us or have no direct impact on our lives. The 
association that empathy has with altruism in turn has implications for the basis on which 
empathy promotes cooperative behaviors; relevant theories associated with this are empathy-
altruism hypothesis theory (Batson, 2011) and the negative-state relief hypothesis (Cialdini, 
Kenrick, & Baumann, 1982). The former assumes that empathy will produce concern for 
another’s welfare, which motivates the individual to act pro-socially. The later argues that 
empathy induction triggers egoistic motivations, in which individuals act pro-socially in 
order to relieve the negative affective state - one of temporary sadness or sorrow- by 
witnessing another person’ suffering. Both theories predict that empathetic concern (either 
through perspective taking or affective empathy) promote cooperative behavior, but diverge 
significantly with respect to the underlying motivation (altruism or egoism). In the case of the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 2011), it predicts that if we feel empathetic concern for 
another group member, we will be altruistically motivated towards them, which is observed 
through contributing tokens to the group pot in a PGG. Given that neither of these theoretical 
accounts make any specific claims that could be used to generate predictions with respect to 
status, we consider the fairness and empathy account proposed by Yamamoto and Takimoto 
(2012). They claim that empathy promotes prosocial behaviors, whereas a sense of fairness 
stabilizes prosocial behaviors. The two work in tandem, where empathy promotes prosocial 
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behaviors under a sense of fairness, and empathy is attenuated under conditions in which a 
sense of fairness is undermined. In fact, they claim that empathy alone will not operate in 
promoting prosocial behaviors in the absence of a sense of fairness. They also claim that the 
basis of the complementary role between the two is driven by an evolved preference for 
similarity to others. That is, the more similar we perceive we are to others, the more likely it 
is that, through a sense of fairness, empathy will promote prosocial behaviors. Thus, in the 
present study, given our empathy manipulations, we test the following predictions: 
Prediction 3: Overall, when perspective taking inducements of empathy are present, 
irrespective of status manipulations, there should be greater displays of cooperation through 
contributions to a public good compared to no-empathy inducements.  
Prediction 4: If a sense of fairness is used to complement empathy in supporting 
cooperative behaviors, then under conditions in which empathy inducements are present, 
there should be evidence of an impact of empathy on cooperation under conditions in which 
the status of individuals is equal (i.e. fair), rather than unequal (unfair). 
General Methods 
Overview 
In the present study four experiments were reported in which real participants were 
exposed to a series of 10 rounds in a linear PGG while interacting with three fictional players 
(Experiments 1-3), and another real player (Experiment 4). The assignment of participants to 
key experimental conditions (high-status v.s low-status) in Experiment 1 was based on a 
random draw of a colored ball picked from an occluded black box (chance-status). Thus, 
Experiment 1 tested predictions 1, and 3. In Experiment 2 participants were assigned to status 
conditions (high-status vs. low-status) according to their performance on a digit cancellation 
test (effort-status), and thus tested predictions 1, 2, and 3. Experiment 3 was a pure test of the 
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manipulation of empathy on cooperation, in which the endowments were the same for all 
participants. Experiment 3 tested prediction 3 and 4. Experiment 4 was a replication and 
extension of Experiment 1 in which all players in the 2-player PGG were real and interacted 
with each other, and in which the allocation of status (low-status, equal-status) was dependent 
on chance (chance-status). Experiment 4 tested prediction 3 and 4. 
In all four experiments the analysis of the data was the same. We first checked the 
effectiveness of the empathy manipulation and then conducted a mixed repeated-measures 
ANOVA to examine the effects of empathy and status on cooperation using proportion of 
contribution (PoC) in the PGG.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to test the extent to which empathy (through perspective 
taking manipulations) induced cooperative behaviors in a PGG under conditions in which 
status (high-status, low-status) was achieved through chance.  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-four volunteers (58 female and 36 male) were recruited from Queen Mary 
University of London via emails and fliers. The mean age of the participants was 20.71 years 
(range from 18 to 32; SD = 3.09). Based on the condition they were assigned to, they were 
given different final payments. In the high-status condition, participants were paid between 
£10 and £15 ($14.02 - $21.02); in the low-status condition, participants were paid between £5 
to £7 ($7.01 - $9.81).  
All participants gave written informed consent prior to participation. After the 
experiment, they were paid an amount for their participation on the basis of the tokens gained 
in the PGG. In each PGG 25 tokens was equal to £1 ($1.40), which all participants were 
made aware of at the start of the experiment. The Ethics Committee of the university 
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approved the study. The experiment was carried out in accordance with The Code of Ethics 
of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki); as with the other three 
experiments.  
Design and Materials  
Experiment 1 was a 2 × 2 (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy] × Chance-status 
[high-status, low-status]) between-subject experimental design. The critical dependent 
variable was participants’ proportion of contributions (PoC) in each round of the PGG, which 
comprised 10 rounds in total. Participants’ contributions from round to round were assessed. 
In addition, we recorded other dependent measure in a set of questions given before 
(demographics, personal stories, hobbies) and after the main task (estimates of similarity, 
estimates of empathy, believability of study, strategy development). The pre-questions 
requested details on age and gender, and questions concerning participant’s positive (i.e. 
“Describe an event that has happened to you that has made you happy in the last year”) and 
negative experiences (i.e. “Describe an event that has happened to you that has made you sad 
in the last year”), and their hobbies. Post-questions consisted of rating scales to assess 
participants judged similarity to, and empathy towards each of the three virtual players. The 
post-questions recorded participants’ impression (similarity, empathizing) towards the three 
other virtual players on a 9-point scale, ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). 
Participants’ photos were taken at the start of the experiment using a phone camera that was 
uploaded on screen along with the photos of the three virtual players; these steps were 
designed to ensure that participants felt that all of the participants in the game were 
experiencing the same procedures, and were supposedly interacting with each other live 
online. The reasons for using virtual rather than real players was to allow for careful 
manipulations of the range of empathy and the impact it would have on the participants’ 
behavior during the PGG. The three other virtual players’ photos and profiles were made in 
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advance, and piloted. Finally, debriefing questions were presented to participants to assess 
whether they believed that they were interacting with three other players online, and whether 
they recognized the three other players. 
The PGG was programmed and implemented via a computer using E-prime 2.0 
software. The game was arranged such that each participant was playing with three other 
players whose actual profiles including stories (regarding either negative events they 
experience, or their chosen hobbies) and photos were prepared in advance; this method is 
often referred to as “interaction deception”. In the high-empathy condition, the three other 
players’ profiles referred to a negative event that had been experienced (Player 1 = a break up 
with a partner, Player 2 = a car accident, Player 3 = a stolen mobile phone), which to some 
extent can be categorized as social pain/psychological pain. In addition, participants were 
instructed, “While you are reading this, try to imagine how the person felt about what they 
have just described. Try to imagine how the person feels as a result (i.e. perspective taking 
instruction), which was based on Batson & Moran’s (1999) empathy induction method. In the 
no-empathy condition, the profiles referred to neutral events (Player 1 = swimming, Player 2 
= ride bicycle, Player 3 = running most mornings). There were no perspective-taking 
instructions as to how to read the profiles. Crucially, it is worth pointing out here that the 
empathy induction methods we used are perspective taking (Batson & Moran, 1999; Epley, et 
al, 2006; Gilin, et al, 2012), which is more typically construed as cold empathy, rather than 
hot empathy (Loewenstein, 2000; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). In addition, while we tried to 
match the suffering stories with the neutral stories in terms of word length, and level of detail, 
it is possible that the suffering stories could be construed as more socially oriented than the 
neutral stories. In this regard, the emphasis in both suffering and neutral stories were couched 
in terms that made salient the experiences of the individual, rather than emphasising any 
social component of the stories in both sets.  
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The assignment of participants to each experimental condition was carried out prior to 
the main experiment. The method by which we manipulated the high-status and low-status 
conditions was based on the endowments of the participant in each round. This study 
involved a status manipulation, in which half of the real participants were endowed with 30 
tokens (high-status) and the other half were endowed with 10 tokens (low-status) on each 
round. All the three other virtual players were given 20 tokens per round regardless of high-
status or low-status group. Thereafter the allocation to empathy and no-empathy conditions 
was determined randomly. In this PGG program, the amount contributed by the three virtual 
players was fixed across for all participants and was based on the average contributions 
reported in Fehr and Gӓchter’s study (2000) (taking into account the standard deviation) in 
the partner-treatment without punishment condition. The combined total contribution of the 
three virtual players on each round was as follows: 27, 34, 31, 24, 22, 23, 24, 18, 12 and 10. 
Procedure  
Each participant was tested individually in a soundproofed experimental cubicle 
facing a computer monitor. After reading the information sheet and signing the consent form, 
participants were required to pick a ball from a black box without looking inside and were 
told the color of ball determined their assignment to an experimental condition. If they picked 
the red ball, the participants were assigned to the high-status condition; if they picked the 
blue ball, they were assigned to the low-status condition.  
Next, the experimenter told the participant that since the experiment required them to 
work with three other players online together, they were required to do some preparation. “As 
we said in the information sheet, you are going to play this joint task with three other players 
online. We cannot let you talk with each other, since we need to conduct this study under 
controlled conditions. What we will do is exchange your profile with three other players. In 
order to do that, we need to collect your picture and some personal information.” Having 
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been informed that their data would be kept confidentially (i.e. only for the purposes of the 
experiment, after which there would be no basis on which an individual participant would be 
identifiable from the data collected), participants were asked to fill in the pre-questions, and 
to take a photo with a neutral facial emotion in front of a white walled background. 
Participants were then asked to wait for approximately 5 minutes and were told that the time 
was needed to coordinate the other players that were taking part in the experiment; this is 
where the interaction deception was involved. During this time participants were told to 
carefully read the instruction for the PGG. According to the color of ball they picked, they 
were given the corresponding instruction for that condition. In the high-status condition, the 
instruction explained that they wold be given 30 tokens per round, whereas in the low status 
condition, the instructions explained that participants would be given 10 tokens per round; in 
both cases, participants were made aware that the other participants would have 20 tokens per 
round.  
The experimenter came back to the experimental cubicle after uploading the 
participants’ picture to the computer running the PGG program. The experimenter asked the 
participants to explain the instructions in order to demonstrate their understanding of the task. 
Then the experimenter showed participants the three other players’ pictures alongside their 
own picture. “These are the players you are going to play with, and you will see their profile 
in the program.” To be more persuasive, the real participant picture was always the first 
picture to be presented, and the three other face photos followed. After entering some basic 
information (participants’ number, gender, age), they were reminded of the instructions of the 
PGG. Then they were asked to wait for the experimenter to set up the other players, and on 
return, participants were instructed to press the SPACE key to get started. 
In the PGG program, the high-empathy condition was presented with the empathy 
induction procedure. They were instructed: “Next you will see profiles of the three other 
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participants who will work together with you. While you are reading this, try to imagine how 
the person felt about what they have just described. Try to imagine how it has affected them 
and how they feel as a result”. In the no-empathy condition, participants were instructed: 
“Next you will see the profiles of three other participants who will work together with you.” 
After these instructions all participants were consecutively presented with the picture and 
profile of each of the three players. After seeing the profiles, participants started the PGG. 
For each round when participants were required to decide on how many of their tokens to 
contribute, they were presented with the pictures of the three other players. In the high-status 
condition, it was from 0 to 30 tokens; whereas in the low-status condition, it was from 0 to 10 
tokens. After they had made their decision, they entered their choice, and were required to 
wait between 4000 to 12000 ms, randomly determined by the program. Then they were given 
feedback, “Other people contributed tokens: (the sum of three other players’ contributions); 
Your contribution this round is: (the number of tokens they contributed); Your share of the 
pot for this round: (the total number of tokens they will receive on that round); and Your 
cumulative total of tokens across rounds (the total number they will receive across all 
rounds)”. Then the program moved to the next round. This procedure was repeated until all 
10 rounds were complete. Participants were required to copy down all the values presented 
on each round using a pen and form provided. The reason for this was to make sure that 
participants attended to all the feedback information presented on the screen on each round. 
On completion of the PGG, participants were then presented with the post questionnaires, and 
then the debrief questions, after which they were informed of details about the study, its 
purpose and the interaction deception issue.  
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Results 
 Cohen (1988) provides a benchmark to define small (.1), medium (.3) and large (.5) 
effects where Cohen’s d is presented. Where effect sizes for partial η2 are presented, the 
following broad classification is used to define small (.02), medium (.13) and large (.26) 
effects (Bakeman, 2005). In the analyses we presented in this and the remaining three 
experiments, we use these benchmarks to determine the size of the effects we report.  
Empathizing Manipulation Check 
For Experiment 1, an independent-samples t-test was conducted on judgments 
regarding the extent to which participants empathized with the experiences of the other 
players they were interacting with in the PGG in no-empathy (n = 49) and high-empathy (n = 
45) conditions. Empathizing judgments were higher in the high-empathy conditions (M = 
4.75, SD = 1.44) compared to the no-empathy conditions (M = 3.71, SD = 1.96), (d = -.604).  
Empathy & Status manipulation  
The mean PoC in each of the 10 rounds in the four conditions for Experiment 1 are 
shown in Figure 1; the overall mean PoC for each condition is: high-status no empathy (M 
= .44, SD = .18), low-status no empathy (M = .56, SD = .18), high-status empathy (M = .49, 
SD = .18), low-status empathy (M = .55, SD = .18).  
Insert Figure 1 
In all analyses of contributions made in the PGG here and in the other three 
experiments, we analyse the proportion of contributions made, not the absolute values. The 
reason for this is that the total amounts that could be contributed differ in range given our 
manipulations of status. That is those in the high status conditions could contribute anything 
between 0 and 30 tokens on each round, those in the low status conditions could contribute 
anything between 0 and 10 tokens on each round, and respondents (though fictitious, but 
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based on actual prior contributions reported by Fehr and Gӓchter’s study (2000)) could 
contribute anything between 0 and 20 tokens. Given these differences, and to make sensible 
comparisons, the proportion of contributions of the endowment on each round were used in 
any analyses of PGG contributions.  
A univariate analysis was conducted with PoC in the first round as a dependent 
variable, and empathy and chance-status as fixed-factor variables. There was a very small 
Chance-status × Empathy interaction on first round contributions (ηp2 = .001). There 
was a small main effect of empathy on PoCs (ηp2 = .02); and a small main effect of chance-
status on PoCs (ηp2 = .04). Focusing on PoCs across rounds, a 10 × 2 × 2 (Round [1:10]), 
within-subject variable × (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy]) × (Chance-status [high-
status, low-status]) between-subject variables repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. 
The interaction between chance-status and empathy was very small (ηp2 = .01) (see 
Figure 1). Also, there was also a very small main effect of empathy on PoCs, (ηp2 = .003). 
There was a small main effect of chance-status on PoCs (see Figure 1), (ηp2 = .06), and a 
small main effect of round, (ηp2 = .06), suggesting a general decrease in contributions across 
rounds. Overall, we found that across rounds the low-status group contributed more to the 
group pot compared to the high-status group.  
Discussion 
The key finding in Experiment 1 supported prediction 1, suggesting that the low-
status group behaved more cooperatively than the high-status group. There was weak 
support for prediction 3. That is, there were very small effects to suggest that the 
inducement of empathy increased contributions in the PGG; there was some evidence to 
support this when looking at first round contributions, but this was very small when 
looking across rounds.  
In Experiment 1 status was determined by chance, in order to mimic situations in 
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wealth is determined by lotteries. However, in real life setting status can also be determined 
by effort. Therefore, Experiment 2 was devised with two purposes in mind. First, the aim was 
to examine the extent to which the same pattern of results would be found under a different 
institution system of status acquisition, and to further examine the association between 
empathy and cooperation.  
Experiment 2 
In all respects but one, namely the way in which status was achieved, the design and 
procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-eight volunteers (71 females and 27 males) were recruited from Queen Mary 
University of London via emails and fliers. The mean age of the participants was 21.10 years 
(range from 18 to 44; SD = 4.06). The payments for participating were the same as 
Experiment 1.  
Design and Materials  
Experiment 2 was a 2 × 2 (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy] × Effort-status 
[high-status, low-status]) between-subject experimental design. The critical dependent 
variable was also participants’ PoC in the PGG, of which 10 rounds in total, as with 
Experiment 1. The digit cancellation test is a 23 × 40 matrix which was generated using 
Matlab software (http://uk.mathworks.com/products/matlab/). There are 106 number threes in 
total in the matrix, and participants were presented with matrix on a printed A4 piece of paper 
and had to cross out as many number threes in two minutes. The score 94 was obtained based 
on piloting the test. Prior to the pilot, the number was set at 84 since this was the median of a 
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group (n = 55, Mdn = 84.00, M = 80.17, SD = 1.58) conducting the experiment. However, 
when initially carrying out the experiment, most participants (10 out of 12) achieved above 
the 84 threshold, and so this means that most of the participants were performing at celling, 
and so this threshold did not meaningfully discriminate performance. Therefore, after these 
12 participants, we increased the threshold to 94, which was calculated based on mean 
achieved by the piloted high-status group (n =10, Mdn = 95.5, M= 93.60, SD = 5.13). Those 
achieving a score equal to or above 94 were allocated to the high-status condition, and those 
scoring less than 94 were allocated to the low-status condition. Thereafter the allocation to 
empathy and no-empathy conditions was determined randomly. All participants were 
informed of the allocation procedure prior to performing the test. With the exception of the 
allocation procedure, in all other respects Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1.  
Procedure  
In Experiment 2, participants were required to perform a digit cancellation test instead 
of picking a color ball in a black box to allocate them into high-status or low-status 
conditions. Apart from this, all other experimental procedures were exactly the same as the 
Experiment 1. 
Results  
Empathizing Manipulation Effectiveness Check 
The same analysis conducted in Experiment 1 was conducted on empathy judgments 
for Experiment 2 on the no-empathy (n = 52) and high-empathy (n = 46) conditions. There 
was a large effect (d = 1.31) indicating that empathy judgments were higher in the high-
empathy condition (M = 6.20, SD = 1.73) compared to the no-empathy conditions (M = 3.97, 
SD = 1.67).  
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Empathy & Status manipulation  
The mean PoC in each of the 10 rounds in the four conditions for Experiment 2 are 
shown in Figure 2; the overall mean PoC for each condition is: high-status no empathy (M 
= .38, SD = .21), low-status no empathy (M = .47, SD = .21), high-status empathy (M = .31, 
SD = .21), low-status empathy (M = .60, SD = .21).  
The same analyses were conducted as Experiment 1. There was a medium to large 
effect found for the interaction between effort-status and empathy for PoCs on the first round 
(ηp2 = .18). There was a very small effect of empathy on first round PoCs (ηp2 = .01), but 
there was a medium effect of effort-status (ηp2 = .14). A 10 × 2 × 2 (Round [1:10]), within-
subject variable × (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy]) × (Effort-status [high-status, low-
status]) between-subject variables repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted (See Figure 2). 
There was a small effect found in the interaction between effort-status and empathy (ηp2 
= .06). There was very small effect of empathy (ηp2 = .004). There was a medium to large 
main effect of effort-status on PoCs across rounds (ηp2 = .18). Since there was some evidence 
of interaction effects, post-hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted, which found that in the 
high-empathy condition, the effect was large and suggested that the low-status condition 
contributed more than those in the high-status condition, (ηp2 = .20); in the no-empathy 
condition, the effect on PoCs across rounds based on differences in status was small (ηp2 
= .03) also suggesting that the low status condition contributed more than the high-status 
condition. There was a small interaction effect between round and effort-status (ηp2 = .03), 
and a small main effect of round suggesting that contributions decreased across rounds, (ηp2 
= .04). 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
In addition, we compared the PoCs contributed across rounds for high-status 
conditions in which their status was gained through effort (Experiment 2), with high-status 
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conditions in which their status was gained through chance (Experiment 1). A 10 × 2 (Round 
[1:10]), within-subject variable × 2 (Gained-status [high-status-effort, high-status-chance]) 
between-subject variables repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. There was a small 
effect (ηp2 = .05) suggesting that those in the high-status-effort conditions (n = 47, M = .37, 
SD = .22) contributed less than the high-status-chance conditions (n = 49, M = .46, SD = .18),  
Discussion 
Consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 supported prediction 1. In general, those 
in the low-status group showed more cooperation than those in the high-status group as 
indexed by the level of tokens contributed in the PGG. In addition, in support of prediction 2, 
the evidence suggested that when high-status was achieved through effort, contributions were 
consistently lower than when achieved through chance. While there were very small effects 
in support of prediction 3 consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 did however reveal 
an interaction between empathy and status. For those in the low-status group high-empathy 
condition there was evidence that they showed greater levels of cooperation than those in the 
low-status no-empathy group; there was also very small effects suggesting the same 
pattern in the no-empathy status conditions. Thus far, given the very small effects 
revealing an association between empathy and cooperation in both Experiment 1 and 2, 
Experiment 3 was conducted to fully explore the empathy-cooperation link.  
Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 was designed to examine the link between empathy and cooperation 
under equal resources conditions (Yamamoto & Takimoto, 2012) as a way to establish the 
extent to which the empathy-cooperation link is reliable independent of the manipulation of 
status.  
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Method 
Participants 
Sixty-nine volunteers (47 females and 22 males) were recruited from Queen Mary 
University of London. Participants were aged between 18 to 56 years old (M = 22.68, SD = 
5.65). On completion of the experiment, participants received between £6 and £15 ($8.41 to 
$21.02) based on their performance in the linear PGG (25 tokens = £1). They were randomly 
allocated to one of three conditions (high-empathy, low-empathy, no-empathy) by a 
randomly generated number in excel. 
Design and Materials  
Experiment 3 was a between-subject design with 3 levels (empathy [high-empathy, 
low-empathy, no-empathy]) experimental design, and the critical dependent variable was 
participants’ PoC per round in the main PGG, of which there were 10 rounds in total. The 
high-empathy and no-empathy conditions were the same as in Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2. In the low-empathy condition participants read the same profiles as those in the high-
empathy condition, but they were instructed, “While you are reading this, try to take an 
objective perspective towards what has just been described. Try to remain as objective and 
detached as possible.” This served as an intermediate level of empathy induction based on 
previous empathy induction techniques (1999). With this exception, and the fact that all 
participants received the same endowment as the virtual players on each round [20,20,20,20], 
in all other respects Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 1 and 2.   
Procedure  
After the participants completed reading the information sheet and signed the consent 
form, participants were randomly assigned into one of three conditions. In all other respects 
Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 1 and 2.  
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Results  
Empathizing Manipulation Effectiveness Check 
For Experiment 3, a one-way ANOVA was conducted using mean estimates of 
empathy. The analysis revealed a main effect of empathy, suggesting that across the three 
conditions participants self-assessed empathizing varied (ηp2 = .18). Self-reported 
empathizing was higher (d = .69) in the high-empathy (M = 5.40, SD = 1.41) compared with 
the no-empathy condition (M = 4.04, SD = 2.37), and higher (d = 2.09) in the low-empathy 
(M = 5.93, SD = 1.77) compared to no-empathy. There was also a difference between high 
and low-empathy conditions, suggesting that self-assessed empathising was higher (d = .33) 
in the low empathy condition compared to the high empathy condition.  
Empathy manipulation 
The mean PoC in each of the 10 rounds in the four conditions for Experiment 3 are 
shown in Figure 3; the overall mean PoC for each condition is: high empathy (M = .44, SD 
= .22), low-empathy (M = .44, SD = .22), and no empathy (M = .47, SD = .22).  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
First round data for Experiment 3 was used for one-way ANOVA to explore the main 
effect of empathy, for which there was a very small effect (ηp2  = .001). Next a 3 x 10 
(Round ([1:10], within-subject variable × Empathy [high-empathy, low-empathy, no-empathy] 
between subjects variable) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. There was a medium 
main effect of round, (ηp2 = .13), suggesting that contributions generally decreased across 
rounds. There was a very small main effect of empathy on PoCs across rounds (ηp2 = .004) 
(see Figure 4), and there was a very small interaction effect between round and empathy (ηp2  
= .01) (see Figure 3) 
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Overall Deception Success Check 
At this stage we examine data from all three experiments in order to assess the extent 
to which the deception introduced in our study impacted on any of the behavioral measures 
we recorded. Taking all of the participants into account across all three experiments we had 
184 data points having excluding those reported ‘unsure’ in our debrief questionnaire, or 
where there was missing data. Of the 184 data points we include in our analyses participants 
either answered Yes, they believed that the experimental set-up was as we had described (i.e. 
that they were playing with 3 other real participants), or No they did not believe our 
experimental set-up, and were unconvinced that they were interacting with 3 other 
participants in the PGG. Across all three experiments, 40% of participants responded No in 
our debrief questionnaire. A Round (1-10) x Deception success (yes 1, no 2) repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted. The results found that the interaction between round and 
deception revealed a very small effect on contributions in PGG (ηp2 =.00001). 
Discussion 
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 found very small effects in 
support for Predictions 3, and there was also a very small effect in support for Prediction 4. 
In line with previous studies (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble et al., 
2010), we used a similar design in which one participant is interacting with 3 fictitious 
individuals. The very small effects revealed that this did not adversely impact the pattern of 
contributions in the three experiments included in this study. Nevertheless, to fully test our 
manipulations regarding status and empathy, we considered it of importance to examine the 
extent to which our findings would replicate in an experiment in which participants were 
interacting with real players.   
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Experiment 4 
 Experiment 4 used a 2-player PGG, in which the set up was the same as a typical 4-
player game, but with 2-players, in which status (low-status, equal-status) was achieved 
based on chance using the same procedure as that of Experiment 1. The rationale for the 
changes in design are as follows. First, we consider it of important to examine the extent to 
which our pattern of results generalize to situations in which real players are facing a genuine 
social interaction with other real players. Second, thus far we have not conducted a direct 
comparison between a control status condition with a status manipulation. Therefore, given 
that we found small to medium effects for low status conditions in Experiment 1 and 2, we 
examined the extent to which low status conditions contributed more than conditions in 
which the endowment was the same for both players (i.e. equal-status). 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and sixty volunteers (87 females and 73 males) were recruited from 
Queen Mary University of London. The mean age of the participants was 22.86 years (range 
from 18 to 50; SD = 4.97). The payments for participating were the same as Experiment 1 
and 2. 
Design and Materials  
Experiment 4 was a 2 × 2 (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy] × chance-status 
[low-status, equal-status]) between-subject experimental design. The critical dependent 
variable was also participants’ PoC in the PGG, of which there were a 10 rounds in total, as 
with Experiment 1 and 2. The basis on which participants were allocated to the following 
four conditions was the same as Experiment 1: high-status no-empathy, high-status empathy, 
low-status no-empathy, and low-status empathy.  
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Procedure  
The pairs of participants were tested together in a sound-proofed experimental cubicle 
facing two individual computer monitors with a dividing folding screen. Participants were 
randomly allocated to Player A or Player B based simply on the first person to enter the 
cubicle; the first person was allocated to Player A, and the other person was allocated to 
Player B. After reading the information sheet and signing the consent form, one of the two 
players was asked to volunteer to pick a ball from a black box without looking. If they picked 
the red ball, the participant was assigned as equal-status [20 tokens; 20 tokens]; if they picked 
the blue ball, they were assigned as low-status [10 tokens: 20 tokens]. After that, they were 
allowed to start the experiment. Once seated and allocated to their roles, all remaining 
procedures were identical to Experiment 1.  
Results  
Empathizing Manipulation Effectiveness Check 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted on judgments regarding the extent to 
which participants empathized with the experiences of the other player in the no-empathy and 
high-empathy conditions. Empathizing judgments were higher (d = -1.25) in the high-
empathy condition (n = 80, M = 7.40, SD = 1.57) compared to the no-empathy condition (n = 
80, M = 4.75, SD = 2.53).  
Empathy manipulation 
The mean PoC in each of the 10 rounds in the four conditions for Experiment 4 are 
shown in Figure 4; the overall mean PoC for each condition is: equal-status no empathy (M 
= .52, SD = .30), low-status no empathy (M = .56, SD = .26), equal-status empathy (M = .56, 
SD = .31), low-status empathy (M = .69, SD = .29).  
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Insert Figure 4 about here 
Looking at differences between conditions across both players, based on first round 
contributions. A Univariate analysis was conducted and revealed a very small main effect 
of empathy (ηp2 = .000001). There was a small main effect of status, (ηp2 =.02) suggesting 
that those in the low-status condition (M = .62, SD = .36) contributed more than the equal-
status condition (M = .60, SD = .36). There was a very small effect of an interaction between 
empathy and status (ηp2 =.001). 
Focusing on PoCs across rounds, a 10 × 2 × 2 (Round [1:10]), within-subject variable 
× (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy]) × (Chance-status [low-status, equal-status]) 
between-subject variables repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted (see Figure 4). There 
was a very small effect of an interaction between chance-status and empathy (ηp2 = .006). 
There was a small main effect of empathy (ηp2 = .02), and a small main effect of status (ηp2 = 
.02). There was also a small main effect of round (ηp2 = .03), suggesting that contributions 
generally decreased across rounds. Overall, we found that across rounds there was a trend 
suggesting that the low-status group contributed more to the group pot compared to the 
equal-status group. 
Looking at contributions across rounds, for Player A only, a 10 × 2 × 2 (Round 
[1:10]), within-subject variable × (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy]) × (Condition [low-
status; equal-status]) between-subject variables repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. 
There was small effect of an interaction between chance-status and empathy (ηp2 = .02). 
There was a small main effect of empathy (ηp2 = .05), and a small main effect of status (ηp2 = 
.03). There was also a small main effect of round (ηp2 = .04). Again, we found that across 
rounds there was a trend suggesting that low-status players contributed more to the group pot 
compared to the equal-status players. 
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The same analyses were conducted for Player B. There was small effect of an 
interaction between chance-status and empathy (ηp2 = .02). There was a very small main 
effect of empathy (ηp2 = .008). There was a small main effect of round (ηp2 = .06). There was 
also a small main effect of status (ηp2 = .02) suggesting that low-status players contributed 
more to the group pot compared to the equal-status players. 
Discussion 
Experiment 4 was designed to extend the findings reported in Experiment 1 and 2 
under conditions in which participants were taking part in a genuine social interaction in a 
PGG. Experiment 4 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 in a 2-player PGG. Overall, the 
findings suggest that those in the low-status group contributed more than those in the equal-
status group. There was also some evidence to suggest across rounds, the empathy induction 
method lead to increases in contributions for the empathy conditions compared to the no 
empathy induction conditions.  
Summary and Concluding Discussion 
The main objective of this study was to examine the following two questions: 1) To 
what extent are pro-social behaviors impacted in situations in which the resources gained 
(either through chance or effort) by one individual in the group differ? 2) To what extent does 
empathy promote pro-social behaviors given the way in which one individual in a group 
achieves their status (i.e. through chance or effort)? Overall, the findings from four 
experiments suggest that, individuals with less resources than their group members (low-
status) tend to be more cooperative compared to individuals that have more resources than 
their group members (high-status), and those with equal resources (equal-status). In addition, 
we found that any attempts to induce empathy in individuals resulted in very small effects 
on cooperative behaviors. In the discussion that follows, we consider the evidence 
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specifically in relation to the four predictions we tested, and the implications of our findings 
with respect to previous theoretical and empirical work.    
Prediction 1: Informed by prior empirical (Bennett, 2012; Cote, House, & Willer, 
2015; Guinote, et al., 2015; Piff, et al., 2010) and theoretical work (Kafashan et al., 2014) 
examining the relationship between status and pro-social behaviors, we predicted the 
following: Overall low-status individuals will show greater cooperation, as evidenced 
through contributions to a public good, compared to high-status individuals. We found 
support for this in Experiment 1 in which status was gained through chance, and in 
Experiment 2 in which status was gained through effort. In addition, we found support for 
this in Experiment 4 in which low-status conditions tended to contribute more compared to 
equal-status conditions.  
As Kafashan et al., (2014) proposed, possessing status can change the perceived costs 
and benefits of engaging in pro-social behavior, and so we consider in more depth how this 
emerged in our present pattern of findings. First, it may be the case that low-status groups 
behaved cooperatively because they may have outweighed the cost of increasing 
contributions against the gains of increasing their reputation amongst the group. This is 
consistent with work suggesting that low status individuals do indeed try to improve their 
standing in a social hierarchy (Willer, 2009b), or as a means of affiliating themselves with a 
perceived group identity (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009). Second, it may also be the case that 
the cost of behaving more cooperatively was outweighed by the benefits of demonstrating 
compassion to other group members. Consistent with this, there is evidence to suggest that, 
compared to high-status groups, there is a stronger association between low-status individuals 
and expressions of charitable and helping behaviors (Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 
2012).  Moreover, this also implies that compared to high-status groups, low-status groups 
have stronger feelings of compassion because they are more sensitive to a sense of fairness. 
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This may also potentially help to explain why it is that we found an effect of empathy on 
cooperation was high localized to low-status groups in Experiment 2 in which status was 
gained by effort. As mentioned, one reason may be that this group show greater compassion 
and are more sensitive to fairness (Kraus et al., 2009), but this doesn’t explain why empathy 
revealed larger effects in the low effort-status groups (Experiment 2) than low chance-status 
groups (Experiment 1 and 4).  
One possible explanation is based on the differences in control that people 
experienced (Osman, 2014). When the mechanism by which resources are allocated is via 
chance, then clearly there is no sense of control or real ownership that people can feel with 
regards to having more or less than others (unless one experiences an illusion of control). In 
contrast, when resources are achieved through effort, then people are likely to feel greater 
ownership and responsibility over the resources they acquired, and that the manner by which 
they acquired them was under their control. Some have argued that limited control over the 
attainment of resources leaves low-status individuals, as compared to high-status individuals, 
more dependent on others (Piff et al., 2010), which in turn encourages more cooperative 
behavior. If experienced lack of control amplifies cooperation because now there is a 
dependence on others to show cooperative behaviors, taken together with some sense of 
empathy, then we would expect those in the low-status group to show greater cooperative 
behaviors than the high-status group in the chance-status condition, which is also what we 
found. What is hard to determine is whether differences in behavior resulting from acquiring 
status through effort or chance is a matter of degree (i.e. levels of control), or a matter of kind 
(i.e. control vs. no control).  
Prediction 2: Again, informed by previous empirical work (e.g., Hays & Blader, 
2016), and specifically extending the theoretical claims made by Kafashan et al.’s (2014) bi-
directional causation account of status and cooperation, we considered the extent to which the 
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costs and benefits of cooperative behavior was impacted by the way in which status was 
achieved.  Based on this, we tested the following: If perceived entitlement plays a role, then 
high status individuals will feel more entitled when they achieve their status through effort 
than when achieved through chance, and so will display lower levels of cooperation through 
contributions to a public good compared to high-status individuals achieving their status 
through chance. To this end, we found support for this. When comparing the contributions 
across rounds, those in the high-status condition that had earned their status via effort 
contributed consistently less than those that had achieved their status via chance. This 
suggests that, consistent with prior work suggesting that high-status individuals often make 
pro-social choices with respect to their perceived entitlement and self-interests (Cherry & 
Shogren, 2008; Cote, House, & Willer, 2015; Hays & Blader, 2016), those that had earned 
their status considered the costs of contributing higher than those that gained their status 
chance.  
Prediction 3: There is considerable work suggesting a role for empathy in promoting 
pro-social behaviors, particularly cooperation (Batson, 2011; Cialdini, et al., 1982; Rumble et 
al., 2010; Yamamoto &Takimoto, 2012), and several empirical studies supporting this view 
(Allsop, et al., 2002; Batson & Moran, 1999; Cialdini et al., 1987; Eimontaite, et al., 2013; 
Fultz, et al., 1986; Oswald, 1996, 2002; Pavey, et al., 2012; Stürmer, et al., 2006). Given the 
general theoretical claims that, while they differ with respect to the underlying mechanism 
that drives the relationship, generally empathy promotes cooperation. Therefore, we tested 
the following: Overall, when perspective taking inducements of empathy are present, 
irrespective of status manipulations, there should be greater displays of cooperation through 
contributions to a public good compared to no-empathy inducements. We found very small 
effects of empathy on cooperative behaviors in the PGG in Experiments 1, 2. In fact, on this 
basis Experiment 3 was run specifically to test the role of empathy induction without the 
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status manipulation, to check whether this may have muted the expression of empathy on 
cooperation. Here too we found very small effects. In Experiment 4 we did find a small 
effect suggesting that empathy promoted cooperation.  
First of all, as discussed earlier, there is also evidence that challenges this received 
view, suggesting instead that empathy has a limited (LV et al., 2015; Oswald, 1996; Warren 
& Walker, 1991; Xu et al., 2012, Study 2), or even a negative effect on pro-social behaviors 
(Epley, et al., 2006; Gilin et al., 2012). So, in this light, our findings are consistent with 
evidence suggesting weak effects of empathy on cooperation. Second, given that we did 
find small effects of the impact of empathy induction on cooperation in Experiment 2, albeit 
highly localized to the low-status group, as well as in Experiment 4, we consider the basis for 
this.  
One key reason for the very small impact of empathy on cooperation may be 
explained by the fact that empathy inducing altruism operates effectively on a local 
individual level rather than on a multiple agent level. Thus, when the target of empathetic 
feelings is ambiguous, then this leads to a “escaping effect” (Cameron & Payne, 2011) such 
that the degree of compassion people feel tends to decrease as the number of people in need 
increases. “One death is a tragedy; one million is a statistic.” This suggests that there may be 
an upper bound to empathizing abilities, which is consistent with evidence demonstrating that 
reliably inducing empathy to increase cooperation is most commonly found in dyads (Batson 
& Moran, 1999). Our pattern of findings from Experiment 4 support this speculation.  
An alternative simple explanation might be that our dependent variable was not 
sufficiently sensitive enough to detect a weak empathy manipulation. There are two simple 
counters to this limitation, the first is that previous studies, discussed in the next point, have 
used the same experimental methods and have detected an effect of empathy, albeit a 
temperamental one. The second is that, the same dependent variable used in the three 
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experiments in which status was manipulated, was sufficiently sensitive enough to detect 
small to large effects of status on contributions in the PGG. 
A further reason for why our empathy induction method only very weakly promoted 
cooperative behaviors was because of the particular method we used. The empathy induction 
method adopted here, and in many other studies, is the perspective-taking method in which 
participants are instructed to consider the experiences of others via descriptions of people’s 
suffering (Allsop et al., 2002; Cialdini et al., 1987; Eimontaite et al., 2013; Pavey et al., 2012; 
Stürmer et al., 2006), a form of cold empathy (Loewenstein, 2000; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007).  
This means that they may have been successful in understanding the behaviors and emotional 
states of others, but they did not necessarily adopt the same emotional states of others. This is 
in contrast to experimental methods designed to induce hot empathy in which participants are 
presented with videos of people experiencing bad situations (Oswald, 1996), or even invited 
to directly helping others in need (Oswald, 2000), that more directly induces strong feelings 
of sadness or empathic concern. Therefore, it may simply be the case, that hot empathy which 
induces actual changes in emotional states is a more effective means of promoting 
cooperative behaviors than cold empathy. Though one caveat to this is that, the mixed 
findings concerning the impact of empathy on cooperation specifically concern perspective-
taking methods, in which some studies show a positive influence, and others do not. Which 
suggests that either the technique is unreliable, or the general impact of empathy on 
cooperation is simply less straightforward than has been claimed (Yamamoto &Takimoto, 
2012).  
Prediction 4: For this reason discussion previously, we sought to test Yamamoto and 
Takimoto’s (2012) fairness and empathy account, in which they claim that empathy promotes 
prosocial behaviors under conditions of fairness. From this, we tested the following 
prediction: If a sense of fairness is used to complement empathy in supporting cooperative 
Mediators of Cooperation   36 
behaviors, then under conditions in which empathy inducements are present, there should be 
evidence of an impact of empathy on cooperation under conditions in which the status of 
individuals is equal (i.e. fair), rather than unequal (unfair). We found very small effects in 
support for this prediction. In the equal resource conditions in which everyone was endowed 
with the same number of tokens in the group (Experiment 3, and Experiment 4, equal status 
group), there were very small to small effects to suggest an effect of empathy on 
cooperation. Again, one speculation for this is that the type of empathy inducement technique 
that was used in this study was not strong enough as compared to methods that induce hot 
empathy. A second more nuanced explanation is that, rather than promote cooperation, our 
empathy manipulation, in association with other factors, helped to stabilize cooperative 
behaviors across rounds. However, in all four experiments, contributions reduced across 
rounds, and there were only very small effects to suggest an interaction with empathy and 
contributions across rounds.   
Another contributing factor regarding the very small effect of empathy on 
cooperation in our study concerns a key novel strength of the present study regarding the use 
of real financial incentives. When developing our paradigm, we took heed of critical 
comments from the behavioral economics literature regarding incentives schedules that are in 
line with the aims of the specific task or game (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). In contrast, 
participants in many previous studies which found empathy-induced cooperation obtained 
either a fixed show-up fee (Xu et al., 2012) or course credits for their attendance (Batson et 
al., 1995; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble et al., 2010). In our experiments participant 
payments were directly associated with their choice-behavior. Even though empathy-induced 
altruism may appear to promote cooperation (Batson & Moran, 1999), it may only be the case 
for studies in which payment is not dependent on actual choice behavior. Thus, the cost of 
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cooperative behavior may be actually rather high such that empathy is not strong enough to 
override a self-maximizing strategy (Ma-Kellams & Blascovich, 2013).  
In summary, status and the way in which it is achieved (chance, effort) appeared to be 
a key determining factor in the level of cooperation observed in a multiplayer game. In 
particular, those with less resources than their counterparts tended to be more cooperative 
than those with more resources than their counterparts. The present study found very small 
effects to support the general intuition of the impact of empathy on cooperation under 
previously unexplored conditions of inequality of resources. One reason for the very small 
effect of empathy on cooperation under conditions in which people gain different levels of 
status, is that strong emotional experiences of empathic concern towards others need to 
ameliorate more salient factors, such as, for those with high status, maintaining personal 
finances achieved through effort as well as chance.  
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